Understanding Experimental Economics by Nielsen, Carsten S. et al.
Experiments have become a well-established 
methodological tool in economics. The develop-
ment of experimental economics and the diversi-
fi cation of experimental methods have equipped 
economists with new and powerful means of 
scientifi c investigation. Their worth is readily de-
monstrated in the exciting and promising results 
they have produced, and will continue to produ-
ce. Against the background of this success story, 
our selective discussion critically highlights four 
important aspects of experimentation in econo-
mics. We concentrate on the role and importance 
of material incentives, potentially confounding ex-
perimenter demand effects and strategies to mi-
nimise these, the no deception rule as well as the 
issue of external validity.
1. Introduction
An observer of a typical economic experiment would see 
the following: a group of subjects, most likely under-
graduates majoring in economics, arrive at a laboratory 
having been recruited online. Th e laboratory consists of a 
number of computers surrounded by screens to give priv-
acy to the users. While the subjects sit at these computers, 
the experimenter reads out instructions from a sheet and 
the subjects perform the tasks they have been set, with 
careful monitoring to check that no communication oc-
curs. Afterwards the experimenter pays each subject in 
private according to the anonymous decisions made in 
the experiment. 
Th at is what an observer would see, but what exactly 
is an economic experiment? Taking the latter half of the 
name fi rst, it is an experiment: a controlled data genera-
ting process. One factor of interest (the ‘treatment va-
riable’) is varied at a time, while all other factors which 
infl uence behaviour are held constant. Th is controlled 
variation of factors is crucial to be able to draw causal 
inference.
Secondly, it is economic. Th e majority of economic 
experiments are either theory-testing or theory-sugge-
sting. Economic theory provides a framework and tools 
for describing and analysing economic situations. It 
makes assumptions about individuals’ behaviour and the 
institutions in which they interact to derive predictions 
and to provide explanations for economic phenomena. 
More specifi cally, an economic theory is a description of 
an economic environment, specifying the abstract agents, 
the actions they can take, their information, and how 
they evaluate each possible outcome. When the economic 
environment is in place, predictions about outcomes are 
derived by applying ‘solution concepts’ that describe how 
assumptions about the economic environment translate 
into observed outcomes. Th is is an extremely powerful 
framework that provides intellectual clarity, mathemati-
cal rigour and tractable formalisations. 
Economic experiments form a dialogue with econo-
mic theory: theory is adapted for testing in the labo-
ratory, persistent anomalies or violations are identifi ed, 
the theory is modifi ed or replaced, and the process of 
refi nement begins anew. An experiment, like the theory 
it tests, is an abstraction from the real world. Experiments 
are, by defi nition, descriptively inaccurate. However, this 
does not mean that they are useless. In particular, experi-
ments make the test of logical implications of behavioural 
assumptions explicit and concrete. An experiment can 
thus be seen as a boundary case, but understanding bo-
undary cases is critical for scientifi c development. Th is 
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new theories based on more descriptively accurate data, 
but it provides an important backdrop against which 
new theory-suggesting experiments can be conducted. As 
Mäki (2005) succinctly puts it: experiments are models 
and models are experiments. 
What would subjects in an economic experiment 
then observe? When sitting in front of their computers, 
they make decisions involving real material consequen-
ces. Subjects are told the rules of the experiment, that 
is, the actions that they are allowed to take within the 
experimental environment and how these actions trans-
late (often probabilistically) into some outcome medium 
(usually money). Notice that within this scheme, one 
needs to say nothing at all about the hypothesis being 
tested. Having explained the rules, all the experimenter 
needs to say is something along the following lines: „here 
is the situation in which you, the subject, has to make a 
decision, these are the possible implications of your deci-
sions do what you will“. 
Many of the ways in which the experimental econo-
mic methodology diff ers from other experimental fi elds, 
especially some areas of experimental psychology, stem 
from the objective of internal validity. In this selective re-
view, we will discuss some of the dimensions that are most 
characteristic for economic experiments and compare 
them (where suitable) to methodologies in other fi elds of 
science. Economic theories predict how economic agents 
will act in the presence of real material consequences. 
Th erefore, performance contingent payoff s are critical 
for economics experiments (Section 2). Th eories assume 
that individuals only respond to the incentives found in 
their economic environment, rather than a motivation to 
please the experimenter. Th us the experimenter should 
be careful not to lead subjects by the hand and thereby 
avoid experimenter demand eff ects (Section 3). Th eories 
also assume that agents understand and believe the stated 
relationship between their actions and their payoff s, thus 
deception would endanger this belief and is almost non-
existent (Section 4). We then debate the external validity 
of experiments and the advantages and disadvantages of 
fi eld experiments with regards to this issue (Section 5). 
Finally, we conclude (Section 6).
2. Material Consequences 
Experiments in economics involve material consequences 
of the actions that subjects take (most often monetary 
consequences). For economists, hypothetical questions 
are not considered very informative. Economic theory 
makes no predictions regarding what economic agents 
say that they would do in hypothetical situations, only 
what they actually do when faced with a decision with 
real consequences. It is thus critical for theory testing in 
economics that subjects actually face the consequences 
assumed by the theory. Th is has led to the practice of per-
formance contingent payoff s in experimental economics, 
where subjects’ compensation is contingent on the actions 
they take in a way that is consistent with the theory being 
tested. Th ese payoff s replace the fl at-fee payments that 
are often used in other experimental fi elds. Th ere is over-
whelming consensus among economists that material 
consequences in the form of money aff ect performance 
for the better (Davis and Holt 1993, Roth 1995, Smith 
1998). Th eoretically, there are at least two reasons for this. 
First, everyone values money positively, in contrast with, 
for example, consumer goods that may be valued dif-
ferently among subjects. Second, money is non-satiable 
-more is always better. Th at said, some experiments use 
non-monetary payoff s. For example, in some decision-
making experiments, subjects are asked to value diff erent 
goods which they receive after the experiment has ended. 
Such valuations are typically implemented by using the 
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism (Becker et al. 
1964), which truthfully elicits subjects’ willingness-to-
pay for these goods in monetary terms.
Few experiments published in economics provide no 
payoff s at all. One important exception, with great infl u-
ence on the economic literature, is rooted in psychology 
– namely the experimental documentation of systema-
tic departures from the predictions of rational decision-
making (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979, Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Th eir do-
cumentation is based on hypothetical decision-making 
questions such as: 
Choose between:
A. 2,500 with probability .33 
 0  with probability .67 
B. 2,400 with probability .34 
0  with probability .66 
Most economists think that such questions, and the asso-
ciated answers, are less useful. We typically think of ‘cog-
nitive eff ort’ as a scarce resource that subjects have to al-
locate strategically. If subjects are not paid contingent on 
their actions, so we argue, they will not invest cognitive 
eff ort to avoid decision errors. However, if some payoff  
is provided, the subjects’ decisions will be closer to what 
is predicted by theory and result in a reduction in the 
variance of decision error (Smith and Walker 1993). Th e 
severity of not paying subjects is not obvious. One could, 
for example, argue that subjects answering the aforemen-
tioned hypothetical question use their intuition, and have 
no particular cognitive cost associated with making the 
8 T IDSSKRIF TE T POLIT IK  UNDERSTANDING E XPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
decision (Th aler 1987). When, for example, asked for the 
time of day, few will not truthfully reveal it.
When paying subjects in experiments, an issue is of-
ten how much they should be paid. Th e norm in experi-
mental economics is that subjects must be paid for their 
time. Th us, the average monetary payoff  (or non-mone-
tary equivalent) should be translated into an hourly wage 
roughly equal to the salaries of student jobs. Since perfor-
mance contingent payoff s may become expensive, there 
are a number of ‘tricks’ that economists can use in order 
to stretch limited funds. First, if subjects face exactly 
the same situation repeatedly, we sometimes choose one 
round at random for real payment. Since subjects are 
told in advance that one round will be randomly selected 
but not which one, it is still in their interest to exert the 
same eff ort in each round. Second, for experiments with 
many subjects, we sometimes select one subject at random 
for real payment. Again, subjects are told in advanced 
that one will be chosen at random. While both these 
techniques reduce expenditure, experimental economists 
using these designs typically make the expected earnings 
of any given subject equal to the wage rate.
Th ere is, however, no guarantee that monetary con-
sequences will suitably incentivise subjects in all expe-
riments and that subjects’ decisions will move closer to 
theory. For example, Camerer and Hogarth (1999) found 
that monetary consequences mattered more in decision-
making experiments than in games and market expe-
riments. One reason for this fi nding could be that in 
tedious decision-making experiments, subjects require 
extrinsic monetary payoff s to exert eff ort, whereas in for 
example, games, they are intrinsically motivated to com-
pete. Having said that, the practice of paying subjects in a 
performance contingent manner is in economics conside-
red critical to the internal validity of the experiment and 
the objective of testing the theory in question. Internal 
validity requires the maximum possible level of control 
over all relevant dimensions of the experiment. Th e less 
control there is, the less the experimenter can claim that 
the only source of any observed treatment diff erence is 
the treatment variation they have exposed diff erent expe-
rimental subjects to. As was mentioned earlier, virtually 
no experiments without material consequences are now 
published in economics.
3. Experimenter Demand Eff ects
Experimenter demand eff ects, which are changes in the 
behaviour of experimental subjects caused by their be-
lief about what the experimenter expects of them, can 
also weaken internal validity. A classic and very explicit 
example of demand eff ects is Milgram’s (1963) experi-
ment on obedience. Here experimental subjects had to 
deliver electric shocks (the treatment variable) to others, 
under the pressure of the experimenter, not knowing that 
these shocks were in fact fi ctitious.
Although experimental economists often worry about 
experimental demand eff ects, not all experimenter de-
mand eff ects are actually harmful to the conclusions that 
can be drawn. In fact, sometimes they might actually be 
helpful to achieve other goals, or they are the very object 
under investigation and thus necessary to the experimen-
tal set-up. To illustrate the fi rst point, Andersen et al. 
(2011) conducted an ultimatum experiment in a poor 
region of India. One aim was to investigate people’s reac-
tions to very low proposals in the ultimatum game. Th is 
is diffi  cult because low proposals are usually not made 
by proposers in ultimatum games making it impossible 
to observe responders’ reactions to such low off ers. To 
overcome this problem, they induced low off ers by adding 
a specifi c message to the instructions:
„Notice that if the responder’s goal is to earn 
as much money as possible from the experi-
ment, he/she should accept any offer that 
gives him/her positive earnings, no matter 
how low. This is because the alternative is to 
reject, in which case he/she will not receive 
any earnings. If the responder is expected to 
behave in this way and accept any positive 
offer, a proposer should offer the minimum 
possible amount to the responder in order to 
leave the experiment with as much money as 
possible. That is, if the responder that you 
are matched with aims to earn as much 
money as possible, he/she should accept 
any offer that is greater than zero. Given this, 
making the offer that gives the lowest 
possible earnings to the responder will allow 
you to leave the experiment with as much 
money possible.“ (Andersen et al. 2011, 
3430)
Clearly this instruction informs proposers that the ra-
tional decision is to off er the lowest possible amount, 
creating an experimenter demand eff ect. Secondly, the 
aforecited article by Milgram was studying the role of 
obedience making the experimenter demand eff ect the 
object of study. Th ese two studies together show that ex-
perimenter demand eff ects may be desirable to achieve 
the experimenter’s objective. However, in all situations 
in which experimenter demand eff ects impact and con-
found the results that one sets out to study, they are de-
trimental as they bring into question the conclusions that 
experimenters can draw. 
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In experiments, subjects are placed into micro sy-
stems (Smith 1982, 1994) by the experimenter putting 
him into a vertical authority relationship with the sub-
jects participating. Th e experimenter is the creator of this 
micro system, who has not only a better understanding 
of all its elements but also the better understanding of 
the background of the study. Th is vertical authority re-
lationship is one of the roots of experimenter demand 
eff ects. Hence, factors that infl uence the vertical autho-
rity relationship in the experiment are likely to infl uence 
confounding experimenter demand eff ects.
As Zizzo (2010) and others have already pointed out, 
crucial factors that determine and infl uence this relati-
onship in experiments are (i) the very detailed and explicit 
instructions that subjects are given at the start of the 
experiment, (ii) how possible actions are translated into 
rewards, and (iii) the laboratory setting, for example, the 
fact that subjects are not allowed to talk, that they have 
to sit at their desks while the experimenter and assistants 
walk around to check on the progress of the experiment 
and answer questions. It is here that possible improve-
ments or solutions to the problem of confounding expe-
rimenter demand eff ects lies.
Instructions given to subjects in economic experi-
ments are usually very detailed and written in neutral 
language. Th ey are elaborate as it is very important for 
experimenters to make sure that subjects fully understand 
the economic environment they are confronted with and 
to allow for meaningful replications of the experimental 
study in other settings at other times. Subjects in econo-
mic experiments should not make any decisions without 
understanding the possible consequences of their actions. 
Furthermore, neutral language is used to abstract from 
any specifi c and narrow real world context and thus in-
creases the generalisability of the results.
For example, consider the following excerpt from 
the hypothetical instructions given to a subject in a two 
player ‘principal-agent experiment’ in which subjects al-
located to the role of the agent (Person B) have to work 
for a matched principal (Person A), and the principal pays 
the agent a wage out of the generated profi t:
You are Person B and you are paired with another person: 
Person A. 
Explanations to Part 1: 
Part 1 consists of two stages called ‘Task’ and ‘Guessing/
Feedback’. 
Task: In the fi rst stage you have to choose how much 
eff ort to spend on a task. Th e task consists of clicking 
boxes… 
Clearly, this way of presenting the agent’s task (that is, 
„you have to choose…“) entails the risk of an experi-
menter demand eff ect. Th e instructions are detailed and 
clear (point (i) above), however, Person A might believe 
that the experimenter expects him to click boxes away. 
However, if agents perceive it as their obligation to work 
in this context, it might seriously hamper an analysis of, 
for example, the impact of diff erent incentive systems on 
the agents’ performance.
To assess the potential improvement of an alternative 
way of presenting the agent’s task, consider now the fol-
lowing excerpt: 
You are Person B and you are paired with another person: 
Person A. 
Explanations to Part 1: 
Part 1 consists of two stages called ‘Task’ and ‘Guessing/
Feedback’.
Task: In the fi rst stage you can decide how much eff ort to 
spend on a task that consists of clicking boxes… 
Rather than saying that the agent „has to do“ something, 
the rewritten instructions now say „you can choose how 
much eff ort to spend…“ presenting the task in a much 
less normative way. As suggested before, limiting the 
normative content of instructions minimises the risk of 
undesired experimenter demand eff ects in economic ex-
periments.
Furthermore, in the context of this example, one can 
also infl uence the agent’s sense of obligation by off ering 
an alternative action (point (ii) above). For example, the 
agent could be off ered to always be able to switch to a vi-
deo for the remaining duration of the clicking task. Such 
an option changes the incentives the agent is confronted 
with which in turn might decrease the agent’s feeling of 
obligation with regard to the eff ort task or prevent them 
from doing it out of sheer boredom. Such a strategy has 
been used in Caria and Falco (2014) who equipped the 
experimental rooms with televisions so as to minimise 
experimenter demand eff ects in the setting of a real ef-
fort task.
Finally, regarding the atmospheric issues (point (iii) 
above), the experiment could be moved out of the labo-
ratory to the fi eld or on the Internet so that experimental 
subjects do not actually have to come to the laboratory 
to participate. Field and Internet experiments might help 
to break up or weaken the vertical authority relationship 
most apparent in a laboratory environment. We discuss 
fi eld experiments further in Section 5. 
4. No Deception
When striving for internal validity in experimental eco-
nomics, the use of deception is also ill-advised (see Hey 
1991, Davis and Holt 1993, Friedman and Sunder 1994). 
Th e basis for this advice is the assertion that second-gues-
sing the intent of the experiment jeopardises control and 
internal validity. It is in economics assumed that the eco-
nomic agents described by theory understand the rules 
under which they operate. If subjects in an experiment 
designed to test economic theory are deceived about any 
of these rules, then the validity of their actions can be 
called into question. Th e experimenter potentially looses 
control and he no longer knows the nature of the theory 
being tested by his experiment. 
A second reason for advising against deception in 
economics has to do with the public good of the sub-
ject’s trust in the experimenter. Th e concern here is that 
many experimental laboratories use an overlapping pool 
of subjects. Th us, a public good problem exists in which 
experiencing deception in one experiment may cause 
subjects to second-guess the rules of other experiments. 
Clearly, maintaining this public good involves a diffi  cult 
trade-off  where private benefi ts to the experimenter can 
end up tainting the subject pool. Th e fact that deception 
is seldom used in economics and is received with hostility 
by referees and editors makes the non-deceptive status 
quo maintainable in experimental economics.
In spite of the prominence of the no deception norm 
in experimental economics, there exist few guidelines on 
what constitutes deception. We believe that there is good 
reason to distinguish between various concepts that one 
might be tempted to call deception. For instance, a di-
stinction is made between deception by commission – tel-
ling the subjects things that are not true – and deception 
by omission – not telling them everything. In experi-
ments with deception by omission, subjects are typically 
not aware of every contingency of the experiment. Howe-
ver, if they ask about contingencies we do not lie: we do 
not deceive them by commission. Deception by omission 
has, for example, in experimental economics been used 
to surprise subjects with additional actions when they 
thought the experiment had ended (Andreoni 1988, Cro-
son 1996; Boles et al. 2000, Croson et al. 2003).
We want to stress that the use of deception by omis-
sion comes with at least one caveat. When testing the 
assumptions of a theory or conducting theory-suggesting 
experiments, it is a crucial feature that everything is well 
specifi ed – particularly the rules under which the eco-
nomic agent in the theory is operating. Th e experimen-
ter has to tell the subject everything that is assumed to 
be known by the agent of that theory. Otherwise, the 
experimental environment is no longer an appropriate 
representation of the theory in question. Th is does not, 
however, mean that the rules need to be common know-
ledge in the experiment. If the theory being investigated 
prescribes that agents have diff erent or imperfect know-
ledge about the rules, then the experimenter should not 
tell all subjects all the rules. If we, for example, want to 
experimentally test the interactive unawareness theory of 
Heifetz et al. (2006, 2008, 2013a, 2013b), in which an 
economic agent may conceive only some aspects of the 
environment he acts in and remain unaware of others, 
then we should not tell the subject (acting the role of the 
agent) about things in the experiment he is unaware of 
in the tested theory.
Few examples of deception by commission – tel-
ling subjects things that are not true – can be found 
in the economics literature. One rare economic study 
that employs deception by commission is Schneider and 
Pommerehne (1983), who experimentally examine the 
free-rider problem in public goods provision. In order to 
control for the tendency that free riding increases with 
group size (at a low cost), they deceive subjects by having 
them think that there exist participating subjects at two 
other universities. Furthermore, the actual subjects were 
wrongly told that the actions made at the other universi-
ties were already known, so that the experimenter could 
determine the outcome of the experiment immediately 
after the real bidding. Th e problem is, of course, that if 
such deception by commission is detected, subjects will 
start to second-guess the intent of the experiment. Th e ex-
perimenter could try to avoid the possibility of being de-
tected by making sure that subjects did not make contact 
after the experiment or by performing the experiment 
with subjects visually separated from each other. Th e pro-
blem with this is that such procedures can make subjects 
suspicious of deception in the experiment. Worst-case 
scenario, experimental economists would be saddled with 
a reputation for routinely deceiving subjects, rendering 
proper experimental control extremely diffi  cult.
We believe that deception by omission of subjects 
in an experiment can be used when theory prescribes 
heterogeneous knowledge among agents, as was the case 
with the interactive unawareness theory. However, one 
should refrain from using deception by commission in ex-
perimental economics, although we do acknowledge that 
there have been psychological experiments that used de-
ception by commission to spectacularly good eff ect. For 
example, the aforecited Milgram experiment would lose 
its force if some subjects had not believed that they were 
administering dangerous shocks to an unwilling subject. 
If, however, subjects in Milgram’s experiment had rea-
sons to doubt the experimenter, then all the advantage 
of deception is lost. To mitigate the undesirable eff ects of 
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deception, experimental psychologists often debrief their 
subjects, revealing the deception and asking them not 
to tell other potential subjects about their knowledge. 
Although this is recommended and often required by 
ethical committees, to economists this practice only en-
hances the likelihood of recruiting subjects who enter 
the experiment expecting deception and further weakens 
internal validity.
Further discussions on whether or not deception can 
be used in experiments, and especially the methodolo-
gical diff erences between experimental psychology and 
economics, can be found in Bonetti (1998), Hey (1998), 
McDaniel and Starmer (1998), Hertwig and Ortmann 
(2001), Ortmann (2002) and Jamison et al. (2008).
5. External Validity
We have until now argued that experiments are data ge-
nerating processes that should be used for theory-testing 
and theory-suggesting enquiries, and that the experimen-
ter should do his utmost to ensure experimental control 
and internal validity in an attempt to ensure that it is an 
appropriate test of some theory.
However, an important question is whether behaviour 
inside the laboratory is a good indicator of behaviour out-
side the laboratory – whether it is externally valid. Recent 
work by Levitt and List (2007a, 2007b, 2008) has que-
stioned what we can learn from laboratory experiments. 
Th ey argue that the implicit assumption underlying the 
interpretation of data in many laboratory experiments, 
that the insights gained in the experiment can easily be 
extrapolated to the real world, is invalid.
For example, one common objection is that the stakes 
(the material consequences) in laboratory experiments 
are trivial. Th e eff ects of high stakes in laboratory ex-
periments are, however, mixed and seem to be context 
dependent (Camerer and Hogarth 1999). Reciprocity, 
for instance, does not disappear in the gift exchange ex-
periment when subjects are paid an equivalent of three 
months’ income (Fehr et al. 2013). But just how often do 
people make decisions involving monthly incomes, and 
how representative would such high stake experiments 
be of the many decisions people make on a daily basis 
involving small stakes? Another often heard objection to 
laboratory experiments is that the number of subjects is 
often too small, which seriously endangers the external 
validity of the results. However, we believe that this ob-
jection draws attention away from the more important 
issues: namely the use of proper econometric methods to 
analyse the data. Effi  cient econometric methods exist for 
analysing small sample experiments (Siegel and Castel-
lan 1988, Manski 2005, Heckman et al. 2013). Finally, 
it has been argued that the external validity of labora-
tory experiments is limited because subjects in labora-
tory experiments behave diff erently to how they would 
behave while not being under scrutiny. However, being 
scrutinised is not an exclusive feature of the laboratory: 
many decisions in the outside world are observed. In the 
laboratory we can, however, systematically study the re-
levance of scrutiny by varying the degree of anonymity, 
for example, investigating diff erences between subject-
subject anonymity and full anonymity between subjects 
and the experimenter. 
Moreover, as theorists we seek a general understan-
ding of the way in which agents’ characteristics, incen-
tives, rules, information and payoff  structures infl uence 
economic behaviour. We do not require that student sub-
jects in a laboratory setting designed to resemble a real 
world environment behave in the same way as professio-
nals. Behaviour may diff er because the subject population 
is diff erent or because of many diff erences between the 
laboratory and the outside world. Th e maintained as-
sumption in experimental economics, as we see it, simply 
asserts that if those diff erences could be held constant 
or controlled for econometrically, behaviour in the la-
boratory and in the wild would be the same. Th is is the 
core idea of what Smith (1982) termed ‘parallelism’. Th e 
chemist could make his sterile test tubes more like the 
real world by adding dirt. Th e fact that he chooses not 
to does not render chemistry experiments irrelevant. Or 
expressed more eloquently: 
„The issue of realism, however, is not a 
distinctive feature of laboratory versus fi eld 
data. The real issue is determining the best 
way to isolate the causal effect of interest…
The casual reader may mistakenly interpret 
arguments about realism as an effective 
critique against the laboratory, potentially 
discouraging laboratory experimentation and 
slowing down the production of knowledge in 
economic and other social sciences.“ (Falk 
and Heckman 2009, 536) 
If the goal is to understand the general principles of be-
haviour, then both experimental and naturally occurring 
data must contribute in parallel to theory. Whether or 
not laboratory fi ndings are externally valid is not crucial. 
Furthermore, if there exist special features of a laboratory 
experiment that might limit generalisability, this can be 
relaxed, if necessary, to better mirror a particular real 
world environment. Just as scientifi c theories are simpli-
fi ed representations of complex real world systems, so are 
philosophies of science simplifi ed representations of com-
plex, varied and overlapping methodologies and practices. 
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To bring to a close the philosophical discussion, it should 
be admitted that external validity is relatively more im-
portant from an economic practitioner’s perspective. 
Especially, since laboratory experiments have turned out 
to be valuable in solving practical problems that arise in, 
for example, implementing matching markets (Kagel and 
Roth 2000) or spectrum auctions (Holt and Goeree 2010).
One practical response to questions of external vali-
dity in recent years has been to move outside the labora-
tory into the fi eld. Harrison and List (2004) defi ne fi eld 
experiments as being methodologically complementary 
to traditional laboratory experiments. Field experiments 
generate data from a particular economic environment 
where subjects themselves choose the environment. Th e 
usual cited advantage of a fi eld experiment is that it more 
closely matches the target domain of theory and hence 
has greater external validity. A caveat to this assertion, 
though, is that a fi eld experiment is close to one specifi c 
target domain. Th ere is no a priori reason to suppose that 
target domain A more closely resembles target B than 
does laboratory L. Another drawback of fi eld experiments 
is that what they gain in external validity, they lose in 
internal validity (Guala 2005, Schram 2005). Harrison 
(2005) raises an objection arguing that control is impor-
tant in both the laboratory and in the fi eld, and that a 
fi eld setting is not an excuse for poor experimental con-
trol. Th is is indisputable. Nevertheless, from a practical 
point of view, control is harder in the fi eld than in the 
laboratory which is an environment specifi cally created 
for the optimal control of economic experiments.
Th e rise and spread of fi eld experiments might be 
thought to herald the demise of the traditional labora-
tory experiment. We do not think that this is the case. 
Neither should it be assumed that there is a hierarchy of 
economic experimental methods, such as it is found with 
the diff erent phases of clinical trials. Laboratory and fi eld 
experiments are diff erent tools, each of which is available 
to the economist to approach diff erent problems in dif-
ferent ways. One can combine laboratory and fi eld expe-
riments to better understand the mechanisms observed 
in the fi eld. For example, this can be done by eliciting 
preferences and relating these preferences to observed 
behaviour in the fi eld (Karlan 2005, Todd and Wolpin 
2006). 
Finally, an essential prerequisite for external validity 
is that experimental fi ndings do not disappear upon re-
plication. As in other social sciences, experimental eco-
nomics has put less emphasis on replication and more 
on ‘eye-catching’ novel results. Unfortunately, such an 
emphasis can potentially threaten the external validity of 
experimental results. As shown by Maniadis et al. (2014), 
a narrow focus on having statistical signifi cance (a p-
value of less than 0.05) can lead to the publication of a 
large number of false positive results. As a consequence, 
many signifi cantly novel results could disappear upon 
replication. One solution is to also take the statistical 
power of experimental fi ndings into account. Another 
solution, proposed by psychologist and Nobel laureate in 
economics Daniel Kahneman2, is to have several research 
groups take part in a ‘daisy chain’ of replication with 
each research group undertaking to replicate the results 
of another research group. 
We believe that a few independent replications can 
dramatically increase the chances that the original fi n-
ding is true. As Fisher (1935) emphasised, a cornerstone 
of the experimental science is replication.
6. Conclusion
We conclude by restating our main point. Th e develop-
ment of experimental economics and the diversifi cation 
of experimental methods have equipped economists 
with new and powerful means of scientifi c investigation. 
Th eir worth is readily demonstrated in the exciting and 
promising results they have produced and continue to 
produce. In recent years, economists have hotly debated 
which form of experimentations is most informative. Th is 
discussion has been fruitful and will in no doubt continue 
in the years to come. In this context it is important to 
acknowledge that theoretical models, naturally occurring 
data, fi eld data and laboratory data are complements, not 
substitutes. Each can improve economic understanding. 
None of these are to be preferred -there does not exit a 
valid hierarchy among these methods and the issue of 
generalisability is universal to them all.
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